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 The People’s Republic of China pursues soft power in the western hemisphere to support 
its national interest.  Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power lacks the necessary detail to be 
considered mature theory, focuses far too heavily on soft power resource supply, and fails to 
account for state utility of soft power.  As a result, Nye is wrongfully dismissive of China’s soft 
power presence and capabilities.  As the case of Latin America demonstrates, China’s “utility of 
scale” soft power approach enables China to exact favorable policy outcomes that serve the 
national interest by driving its continued economic growth.  Chinese soft power in Latin America 
has peripheral strategic implications, but does not directly impede on the long held Monroe 
Doctrine; rather, it very deliberately respects it.  China’s soft power reinforces a key component 
of PRC grand strategy called “hemispheric hedging,” which provides a conceptual construct for 
understanding comprehensive Chinese smart power.  
!ii
INTRODUCTION 
 While international affairs have been complicated in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century by the rise of non-state actors and their increasingly asymmetric impact on the 
international system, growing evidence suggests the system will become further structurally 
complex due to rising state powers over the course of the coming decades.  As rising powers 
attempt to reshape the international order in their favor, they are increasingly likely to challenge 
the preponderance of United States power and influence and the international order.  China’s 
emergence as a global power has promoted great debate among scholars and policy makers with 
regard to what its rise means for the United States, the East Asian region, and for the overall 
global order.  U.S. policymakers in Congress and the executive branch clearly believe a rising 
Asia represents one of the clearest global strategic demarcations of the twenty-first century, 
specifically considering “China’s reemergence as a major power with global impact is especially 
affecting the regional balance of power.”    Indeed, abundant evidence suggests a U.S. “strategic 1
pivot” toward East Asia is well underway.    In a November 2011 opinion-editorial entitled 2
“America’s Pacific Century,” Secretary of State Clinton explained this pivot explicitly:  
   “One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the 
   next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased 
   investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise--in 
   the Asia-Pacific region.”   3
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This strategic pivot centers on China’s rise as a regional and global power.  China’s sustained 
exponential economic growth over the previous three decades has made it the world's second 
largest economy,   raised the standard of living for many of its citizens and has substantially 4
elevated its international profile.  This rapid economic explosion has expanded Chinese interests 
globally.  China’s “peaceful rise” thesis,   as defined in China’s transformation era under Deng 5
Xiaoping and his successors, has centered on its economic growth, primarily driven by exporting 
manufactured goods for global markets.  However, a more recent component of China's overall 
grand strategy is a developing "soft power" approach as its reach has become more global in 
scope. This paper will unpack and closely analyze the Chinese approach to statecraft, focusing 
on its global "soft power" initiatives: the manner in which they have been deployed around the 
world to serve PRC interests and how global soft power pursuits are connected with solidifying 
regional hard power capabilities in East Asia.   As Chinese grand strategy illustrates, soft power 
is a legitimate and necessary instrument of power, but also acknowledges that hard power 
projection capability cannot remain static if a rising power seeks to challenge the status quo 
order.  Chinese utilization of soft power in Latin America provides an excellent case study for the 
manner in which China deploys soft power resources: “utility of scale.”  This paper will examine 
the ways PRC soft power has been deployed and toward what ends in Latin America. 
Additionally, the question of effectiveness of PRC soft power will be addressed.  Perhaps most 
importantly, this paper seeks to demonstrate how China’s authoritarian-capitalist development 
model allows for “hemispheric hedging,” or greater integration of soft power and military 
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strength in both the western and eastern hemispheres.  That is, soft power and economic power 
increases in one region are more easily correlated with increases in military power projection 
capability in another region, when the state is controlling the use of soft and hard power 
resources. 
 While not an explicit work of IR theory, this paper will first examine some of the 
theoretical underpinnings of "power" in the academy literature, scrutinize some of its 
assumptions and apply these analyses to the Chinese power model.  Neorealism and 
neoliberalism are given primacy for discussion’s sake–as these theories demarcate the primary 
division of the power paradigm–and each will be discussed in terms of its value for the U.S.-Sino 
relationship and for the broader global order.  Additionally, the traditional definition of soft 
power, as defined by Nye, will be scrutinized.  Secondly, this paper explores how China has 
deployed its soft power in Latin America, examines the interplay between soft and hard power, 
and considers whether or not soft and hard power should be considered mutually exclusive. 
Additionally, I hope to demonstrate soft power's place in realist thought while countering 
neoliberalism's misgiving that soft power's deployment necessarily increases cooperation among 
states, particularly as it applies to the Chinese power model and the East Asian region.  Thirdly, I 
will examine China's rise and its dynamic affect on the international system, the East Asian 






POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND IR THEORY 
 Power has long been the empirical currency for examining the structure of the 
international system and the ways in which states interact.  In international politics, “power” is 
defined as the ability of state “A” to get  state “B” to do something it would not otherwise do.  6
However, since the end of the Cold War, there has been much scholarly debate as to the changing 
nature of power in today’s international system.    Each of the theories of international relations 7
addresses power differently.  This paper gives neorealism and neoliberalism primacy for 
discussion’s sake, as these theories provide the primary division of the power paradigm. 
Neorealists emphasize traditional hard power resources that rely on empirical measurement, such 
as military strength, whereas the neoliberal institutionalist approach stresses soft power 
resources, a far less empirical approach stressing the intangible aspects of power.  As will be 
discussed, the above division is less stark than realists or neoliberals would argue or 
acknowledge, and the integrated PRC power model offers an excellent example. 
 The realist position follows a predictable historical and repetitious pattern with respect to 
the logic of state behavior.  For realists, interest defined in terms of power is the ultimate 
measure of how states interact with one another, however the various strands of realism are 
marked by differences across the analytical spectrum.  Classical realists, such as Morgenthau, 
hold that states pursue power because “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective 
laws that have their roots in human nature.”    Neorealists, also known as structural realists, hold 8
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that states compete for power in an international system defined by anarchy.  Therefore all states 
seek security by maximizing power because the structure of the international system does not 
ultimately offer a higher authority than the state itself.  Additionally, states tend to pursue 
regional hegemony when given the opportunity and when they have accumulated enough power 
to do so. 
 Neoliberalism, commonly known as neoliberal institutionalism, holds that the tenets upon 
which realism is based have evolved, enabling states to fashion international institutions that 
promote and better enable cooperation among states, despite the anarchic international 
environment.    Keohane and Nye first explored the evolving nature of interstate relations by 9
challenging the realist assumption that states pursuing power and self-interest did not necessarily 
restrain prospects for cooperation because international political economies and globalization 
were producing economic interdependence, thus making the state less a center of gravity.    They 10
argue, because complex interdependence ties the actions and interests of states together, 
cooperation is not only possible, but necessary.  While interstate interdependence offers states 
opportunities and incentives to cooperate, current and historical examples demonstrate that it 
does not necessitate cooperation.  One primary critique of liberal institutionalism is that it 
disregards the any state’s tendency to oppose the relative gains such institutions may provide 
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other states.    As such, one can argue that states in Asia pursue international institutions only if it 11
is in their national interest to do so.  
!
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND U.S.-SINO RELATIONS 
 China’s emergence as a global power has promoted great debate among scholars and 
policy makers as to what its rise means for the United States, the East Asian region, and for the 
global order.  While many agree a rising Asia represents one of the clearest global strategic 
demarcations of the twenty-first century, there exists a diversity of opinion among policymakers 
on exactly what this means for the future trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship.    Similarly, 12
scholars are divided as to what China’s rise means and, while, multiple IR theories are often 
applied to explain future trajectories for the American-Sino relationship, within each exists a 
diversity of thought.  Does China’s emergence represent a threat to United States interests which 
should be constrained?  What does China’s exponential economic growth and its emergence as 
the world’s second largest economy mean for its foreign policy and power projection capabilities 
in East Asia?  What role, if any, will continued rapid economic and social change in China play 
in its own domestic politics and will this affect how China chooses to project power both 
regionally and abroad?  What role will the interdependent economic relationship and respective 
domestic politics play in the future of the U.S.-China relationship?  The literature suggests that 
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three primary theoretical lenses have been applied to analyze this issue, with a diverse spectrum 
of optimistic and pessimistic views existing within each theoretical posture.    13
!!!
NEOREALISM: THE LOGIC OF STATE BEHAVIOR AND THE TRAJECTORY OF U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS  !
For the realist  , any state’s most important goal is survival, because without survival, no 14
other goal has relevance.     States compete for power and influence in an anarchic international 15
system   in which no higher authority exists.  Powerful states attempt to establish a hegemonic 16
presence in their respective regions of the globe and attempt to constrain the power of any other 
state from reaching into the region—often through economic means first and, in turn, hastening 
military power projection.  Furthermore, dominating the region becomes the most realistic 
manner in which a state can best manage its superpower status without overextending itself 
globally.  Some realists part with others with regard to whether or not states can predict the 
intentions of other states with any degree of certainty over time.    Lastly, states recognize that in 17
an anarchic international system in which offensive capabilities and potential malignant threats 
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from other states dominate the competition, the best way to survive is to become as powerful as 
possible.     However, some diversity exists within the realism school of IR theory with respect 18
to the rise of China and usually amounts to a debate over projections regarding “China’s peaceful 
rise to great-power status”   and whether or not a peaceful trajectory will continue or is even 19
possible. 
 With respect to China, a pessimistic realism (often termed “offensive realism”) suggests 
that China is learning from the United States regarding these aforementioned principles which 
largely guided U.S. foreign policy since the nation’s founding.    The U.S. policies of state 20
expansion (Manifest Destiny) and regional hegemony (The Monroe Doctrine) have deterred any 
other state power from dominating the Western Hemisphere and have clearly benefited the U.S. 
national interest economically and militarily.  In recent years, and more noticeably in recent 
months, China has sought to aggressively expand its naval and air power capabilities by 
deploying an increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet in the strategically important South 
China Sea, commissioning its first aircraft carrier, and making the world’s first anti-ship ballistic 
missile (ASBM) operational.  These actions have considerably increased maritime tensions in the 
region.   With respect to military airpower, China has begun to build–after years of reverse-21
engineering Russian-acquired technology–and sell its own fighter jets   and has declared an Air 22
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Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the strategically valued East China Sea.    How will the 23
United States react to China’s growing regional hegemony?  Realism suggests that, if history is 
any indicator, it will react just as it did throughout the twentieth century to other Eurasian state 
powers—Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union–that sought 
regional hegemony: they will constrain it.    For a pessimistic realist, the rise of China will not 24
and cannot be peaceful.   
Other notable realists have adopted a more optimistic position (defensive realism) on 
China: while they agree the behavior of states within the realist theoretical construct will likely 
lead to an intense security competition between the U.S. and China in the coming years and 
decades, they also acknowledge other mitigating factors which may affect the manner and 
timeline in which China continues its rise.    These mitigating factors are threefold: Firstly, 25
China currently lacks the military power to be a true peer competitor with the United States; 
secondly, Chinese economic growth could slow in the coming years and decades due to an aging 
population, the world’s largest middle-class, and a one-child population control policy; thirdly, 
nuclear deterrence will maintain a stability to keep the relationship “in bounds.”    Nevertheless, 26
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they expect China will, given a persistent rate of economic growth, continue on its path of 
military buildup and increase regional security tensions and that other powerful nations, such as 
the U.S. and its strategic allies in the East Asian region, will attempt to balance these actions.   
!
!
LIBERALISM: CHINA’S RISE & ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE, INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION  !
 The liberal internationalist position asks the same question with respect to the rise of 
China and its underpinnings for the U.S.-China relationship: will the rise of China lead to a 
relationship destined for aggression and confrontation with the U.S., or will the convergent 
relationship be deepened by further bi-lateral cooperation and stability through the furthering of 
democratic principles and economic interdependence?  Liberalism, in contrast to realism, posits 
the latter, but also has its own optimists and pessimists. 
 The liberal posture toward China’s rise centers on the idea that continued bilateral 
economic exchange will further anchor the platform for good relations between the U.S. and 
China in the twenty-first century.  The greater trade volume and investment between the two 
nations, the greater the chances for a relationship governed by stability: one that neither side will 
attempt to disrupt.  From 1978 until the end of the twentieth century, the value of U.S.-China 
trade moved from $1 billion to almost $120 billion annually.  By 2004, this figure almost 
doubled to $245 billion.    In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest 27
economy next to the United States.  While the $7.5 trillion economy of China remains small 
!10
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compared to the $15 trillion U.S. economy, the Chinese growth trends are remarkable: just five 
years ago, China’s GDP was half of what it is now. In 2000, average per capita income in China 
was $930 compared with $3,600 in 2009.    U.S. investors continue to pour billions of dollars of 28
capital into China each year.  This bilateral trade relationship, from the liberal perspective, 
promotes stability among nations and is rooted in a quote often attributed to the classical liberal 
and French political economist Frederic Bastiat: “If goods don’t cross borders, then armies will.” 
 Another key component to the liberal idyllic posture is the proliferation of international 
institutions.  Liberalism in international relations assumes an optimistic possibility for human 
progress in world affairs and that, international institutions, and the institutional norms they 
promote, will foster this progress and therefore prevent conflict.  As one would expect, liberal 
institutional theory is a stark deviation from the realist perspective which highlights no higher 
authority than the state.  Liberalism argues that any Chinese trend toward realism is eroded by 
the tenets of international institutions   and this debate sharply divides prominent IR scholars.  29 30
With respect to China, its membership in formal international organizations has doubled since 
1977 from 21 to 52 in 1997 and its membership in NGOs exploded from 71 to 1,163 during that 
same period.      Other liberal models in the literature have explored whether or not the U.S. 31
policy of engagement with China has succeeded in reducing security risk, though acknowledging 
!11
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that a future successful trajectory in China is beholden to and perhaps slowed by several factors 
including potential further suppression of domestic demands for democratization, social unrest 
caused by environmental neglect, and the status of Taiwan.    Since the end of the Cold War 32
regional institutions in East Asia have promoted dialogue among nations including the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN), and the East Asia summit.  Specific to China, the PRC entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in 1996.  Optimistic 
liberals holds that these developments will deter the PRC from acting to disrupt the global order 
because with these organizations comes accountability and expectations, both to which the 
Chinese government have willingly submitted by joining the international community. 
 Lastly, the liberal lens of IR stresses the importance of the spread of democracy 
throughout the world.  No issue is of greater importance to the optimistic liberal’s position with 
respect to China than that of democratization.  The idea that democracies do not war with one 
another is a long-held belief among liberal IR scholars   and U.S. policymakers have used this 33
belief to justify policies of democracy promotion across the globe.  While IR liberals believe that 
the process of Chinese democratization remains slow and acknowledge a cloud over the PRCs 
willingness to allow reforms to proliferate, its progress cannot be denied.      Rooted in Kantian 34
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democratic peace theory, liberalism holds that as China further democratizes, relations with the 
United States will further stabilize and remain peaceful throughout the twenty-first century.  
 However, there exists a liberal skepticism toward the idea that the aforementioned 
principles can prevent a neorealist trajectory for U.S.-China relations defined by bipolar security 
competition that mirrors the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.  Such a pessimism 
argues that, while China’s growing participation in international organizations and its bilateral 
trade relationship with the U.S. are both fine and good, China remains slow in its transition of 
governance and some evidence suggests that China’s rate of democratization is slowing, leaving 
some scholars to theorize that China remains on a trajectory of “trapped transition.”    The 35
concern here lies in the fact that China is by no means a democracy and is defined by continued 
authoritarian political controls and that nations in this perpetual state of motion toward full 
democratization become defined by increasing instability and “hyper-nationalist rhetoric”   tend 36
to go to war.    Other IR scholars have noted that when states struggle to maintain an 37
authoritarian power structure, they look outside of their borders and begin a nationalist drumbeat
—look no further than Iran’s nationalist quest for nuclear capabilities as a primary example. 
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice   has spoken of this phenomenon of state behavior 38
!13
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in interviews.    One can argue that the current security situation in East Asia mirrors this.  There 39
is little question that Chinese nationalist rhetoric has grown in the region and has its neighbors 
concerned, particularly as it relates to its territorial island disputes with Japan—some scholars 
have noted that these recent naval incidents at sea are not recent at all, but rather, part of a 
longstanding aggressive Chinese narrative in the region.    40
It can also certainly be argued that the current authoritarian status quo will be difficult for 
the PRC to maintain in light of the exponential economic and social change in China.  For 
example, the social unrest in the aftermath of the 2008 Chengdu earthquake in which schools 
collapsed while Chinese Communist Party (CCP) buildings remained standing.    Considering 41
domestic responses to product safety issues including toys, baby formula,   and drug safety  —42 43
most of which included government executions of those responsible—it is difficult to imagine 
the world continuing to accept the status quo without consequences, whether from international 
institutions or from within China itself. 
!
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ANALYSIS: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE IR THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 Which of the theories holds the most promise for explaining Sino-American relations in 
the twenty-first century?  To regard such a complex, multi-faceted power relationship as strictly 
adherent to one theory and to entirely disregard all others is a short-sighted venture.  The China 
engagement policy secretly implemented by Kissinger under President Nixon in the early 1970s 
began as a realist venture of national interest to take advantage of a soured relationship between 
the Soviet Union and China and open up a second front for Soviet containment during the Cold 
War.  Clearly the U.S.-China relationship has evolved into one of far greater complexity since the 
beginnings of reform in China during the 1970s but is the relationship zero-sum or positive-sum? 
What trajectory will the relationship follow in the future?   
Given historical perspectives and recent events in particular, it does seem clear that the 
realist lens holds the most promise for the long-term analysis of U.S.-China relations: a growing 
Chinese regional hegemony in east Asia is stirring concerns among its neighbors and it is clear 
the U.S. will seek to balance Chinese power in the region as it relates to its other partners in 
Japan, South Korea, Australia and India.  Recent events, such as Chinese naval buildup, anti-ship 
ballistic missile (ASBM) development, and high-profile, territorial air and naval disputes with 
Japan over the Senkaku/Diayou islands in the East China Sea lend themselves to the regional 
hegemony line of logic and there is recent and clear evidence that the United States is willing to 
push back.  Firstly, history suggests it will do so, as has been previously discussed.  Secondly, 
recent events suggest the U.S. is increasingly unwilling to embolden Chinese power in the 
region.  For example, an examination of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula illustrates this: in 
2010, tensions in the East Asian region remained high in response to the North Korean shelling 
!15
of a South Korean island and revealed to the world a previously undisclosed uranium enrichment 
facility;  China immediately requested a resumption of the Six Party Talks in Beijing, a prospect 44
the U.S. immediately declined and ordered increased joint naval exercises with both South 
Korea   and Japan.    The U.S. rejection of a resumption of the Six Party Talks represents a 45 46
growing impatience with China on North Korea and a U.S. unwillingness to allow Beijing to 
control the situation in the region; however, the U.S. has invited two of its regional partners, 
Japan and South Korea, to Washington for multi-lateral talks on North Korea  —a clear 47
diplomatic response to growing Chinese regional hegemony, while remaining economically 
committed to China.  Also, in a trip to Asia during his first term, President Obama indicated his 
support for a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council—a very clear 
message that the U.S. desires to act as an offshore balancer of Chinese power and influence not 
only in the region but also within international institutions.    This confirms a long-held criticism 48
of the IR liberal’s position with respect to international institutions and China: as the Chinese 
economy continues its exponential expansion and as China participates in an ever-increasing 
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number of international institutions, China uses its membership to further promote China’s 
national interest.  Realism correctly asks: if China’s membership in international institutions does 
not change its regional behavior, then how can the liberal institutionalist position hold for a 
peaceful rise?    Another liberal IR argument holds that when goods and services cross borders, 49
armies do not.  Economic relations in Europe at the end of the 19th century were strong among 
nations in the region and this failed to prevent the largest loss of life in world history in World 
War I.  Additionally, the constructivist position, though useful in intent and satisfactorily 
empirical, in practice it “lacks theoretical substance and is under-specified.”    50
While the realist perspective remains the most useful, particularly with respect to 
growing Chinese hegemony in Asia, it remains less clear that, if indeed as realism suggests, the 
U.S.-China relationship is a zero-sum game, cooperation could never result.    As economic 51
interdependence has deepened between the two nations, the respective domestic polities have 
direct effects on one another—this will likely continue with a growing intensity.  Never before, 
has the U.S. been engaged in a deep, bilateral, economically interdependent relationship whose 
future remained glaring with such a disproportionate amount of uncertainty.  For example, the 
U.S. has long enjoyed China-financed profligate deficit spending, an increasingly unsustainable 
practice, given U.S. long-term debt on pace to reach 90% of GDP by 2020 and an annual deficit 
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and U.S. federal spending reaching 24% of GDP in 2010.    In exchange, China has enjoyed a 52
disproportionately large trade surplus effectuated by a deliberately undervalued Chinese currency 
and exponential economic growth that, despite the troubles associated with the global financial 
crisis, has continued to average at least 8% annually.    U.S. debt held by the public is scheduled 53
to rise to approximately 90% of GDP, or the equivalent to $170,000 per capita as soon as 2020, 
according to Congressional Budget Office projections.  Post-2020 looks exponentially worse for 
the U.S. as an aging “baby boomer” population places unsustainable burdens on domestic 
entitlement programs.  How does any of this relate to China?  Central banks of developing 
countries have added “between $700 billion to $900 billion to their dollar portfolios in each of 
the past three years,”   mostly in U.S. Treasury securities, and the largest by far has been China. 54
The U.S. domestic policy debate will affect its foreign policy prospects and its relationships with 
its foreign bond holders, namely: China.  More simply put: domestic politics matter. 
Just as the domestic debate in the U.S. on China remains heightened, it is important to 
remember the same is occurring in China as it determines the type of power it chooses to become 
as its growing economy fosters social change.    Just as U.S. domestic fiscal policy could 55
dramatically impact its foreign policy decisions in the coming decades, China’s domestic polity 
could also dictate the type of rising power China will become.  Many scholars assert that external 
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threats are less likely to determine the nature of China’s rise, but rather, its domestic economic 
and social change from within will be the primary determinant.       An intense bi-polar security 56 57
competition is clearly not in either country’s national economic interest–the risks clearly far 
outweigh any perceived benefits–and yet, the security situation in Asia remains heightened and 
has escalated between 2010-2013, which argues well for realism.  But does realism detrimentally 
downplay the importance of domestic politics?  Other scholars have certainly contended this is 
the case, particularly with respect to domestic foreign policy institutions.    But, in the age of the 58
global economy, domestic politics are increasingly evermore intertwined with the conduct of 
foreign policy and national interest and perhaps no international relationship better illustrates this 
than that of U.S.-China. 
The rise of China will dominate the foreign policy discussion as the most important issue 
of the twenty-first century and the U.S.-China relationship will remain the most important for the 
overall global order.  From a theoretical perspective, the realist posture holds the most promise 
for the analytical framework of U.S.-Sino relations given the history of state behavior but the 
argument that security conflict is inevitable remains clouded by a diverse set of factors, the most 
important of which is the domestic politics of both nations.  Now that analysis of the two theories 
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has been conducted, let us examine the conceptual framework of soft power and how it fits into 
the two primary theories of international relations.  
!
SOFT POWER DEFINED: PROMISE, BUT PROBLEMATIC 
 The term “soft power,” as defined by, Joseph S. Nye, is: 
  “getting others to want what you want--(it) co-opts people rather than 
           coerces them.  Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of 
   others.”     59!
That is, a state may, by pursuing certain strategies, win desired political outcomes through means 
of attraction rather than threats or coercion.  The soft power concept has grown throughout the 
academy literature since its official introduction by Nye in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and as 
will be discussed here, it has received much attention from Chinese academics and PRC 
policymakers and strategists. According to Nye, one of the primary problems with the realist 
approach to international relations is it defines power solely by the empirical measurement of 
resources, such as military size and hard power projection capability.  Nye believes this over-
reliance of realists on empirical measurement of traditional power resources is incongruous with 
the assumption that nations with the most resources always get the policy outcomes they desire. 
Soft power thus stresses the intangible aspects of “attractive” power such as culture and shared 
values.    According to Nye, soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction 60
rather than coercion or payments.”    Nye argues very clearly in his most specific work on the 61
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topic, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, that in the reordered, post 9-11 world, 
U.S. foreign policy represents precisely the above paradigm.  While remaining the nation with 
the most resources, outcomes are not always congruous with the leverage of those resources.  For 
Nye, the neglect of soft power's importance is the root cause of this incongruity in U.S. foreign 
policy.   
 While the conceptual framework of “soft power” clearly exists in international politics, 
its abstract nature lacks enough strength to tangibly stand alone as mature theory.   First, Nye's 
writings on soft power lack specificity.  Nye offers no persuasive model to explain the different 
ways states can convert their soft power resources into the foreign policy outcomes they desire.  62
He offers neither a specific framework under which a state would be best served to deploy soft 
power over military might–only that it should–nor does he explain how soft power can 
complement hard power except only to say that it works best when it does.  Additionally, Nye 
gives little attention to the fact that, in many cases, soft power resources are not wielded by 
states.  For example, American culture is most often exported by the private sector through 
capitalist global markets, not the U.S. government.  While this can potentially provide positive 
outcomes over the long-term, such as certain states becoming increasingly attracted to the 
capitalist system, it does not always necessitate alignment with U.S. interests in the short term. 
Conversely, British culture is exported through film, television, fashion, and soccer, yet has 
produced little by way of long-term, measurable policy outcomes for Great Britain.  Such 
cultural dominance has not increased the British government's influence internationally and it 
certainly did not prevent the precipitous British decline as a global power post-World War II.  Put 
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more plainly, simply because the world may be transfixed by the latest season of internationally 
popular British television series Downton Abbey, does not mean the world will be transfixed by 
the will of the British state.    While this would seem to point one toward the liberal IR lens–the 63
idea that more is taking place beneath the state level in the post-Cold War era of globalization–
the state remains the primary vehicle by which power is acquired and deployed in the 
international system. 
 Secondly, Nye blindly rejects certain variances that should be considered under the soft 
power conceptual framework.  For example, Nye persistently discusses economic power as hard 
power, a mistake when one considers the economic factors often associated with the power of 
attraction.  While the U.S. economy has struggled to recover from the financial crisis and Great 
Recession of 2007-2009, it remains difficult to argue that U.S. economic power has not been the 
centerpiece of U.S. attractiveness to the world since the end of World War II.  However, the 
anemic growth of the U.S. and global economies and skyrocketing U.S. sovereign debt levels 
have given rise in recent years to some discomfort among rising powers with the U.S. dollar as 
the world's reserve currency and American economic leadership.  As will be discussed, one 
aspect of China's soft power appeal, particularly in left-leaning Latin American countries, centers 
on its hybrid authoritarian-capitalist economic model.  These appeals are achieved through non-
coercive economic means to directly serve China’s self-interest.   
 It makes little sense to consider soft power and economic power mutually exclusive. 
What else is economic power if not using non-coercive means, in a voluntary exchange of goods 
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or services, to co-opt a state into wanting what you want.  It follows then that trade, foreign 
direct investment, and foreign aid programs are certainly soft power and China deploys soft 
power through these means across Latin America.  Interestingly, the U.S. deployed similar soft 
power resources in Europe as it came-of-age as a global superpower with the Marshall Plan in 
the aftermath of World War II.  As Mills writes: 
   "George Marshall believed that a European recovery program could succeed only 
   if European governments, working together, played a key role in its design.  He 
   understood that if the United States used its economic power to bully a weakened 
   Europe into accepting America's vision for the future, America doomed the 
   cooperation necessary for getting Europe back on its feet as a region."    64!
Clearly, Marshall understood the role of co-optation.  Interestingly, the Marshall Plan is widely 
argued by scholars, including Nye, as the quintessential example of American soft power: 
   "This popular cultural attraction helped the United States to achieve important 
   foreign policy goals.  One example was the democratic reconstruction of Europe 
   after World War II.  The Marshall Plan and NATO were crucial instruments of 
   economic and military power aimed at achieving that outcome."     65!
A notable and fascinating difference between the U.S. and Chinese soft power models is the 
timing in which soft power resources were deployed during their respective rises to power.  Only 
after World War II did the U.S. realize that winning the peace would require more than hard 
power and the Marshall Plan was born. The U.S. deployed soft power in the aftermath of World 
War II, only after its military victory: rapid, large-scale military buildup to defeat a continental 
hegemon in Europe and a maritime hegemon in the Pacific followed by rapid, strategic 
deployment of soft power resources under the Marshall Plan.  The Chinese approach is entirely 
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opposite and deliberately so: proactive, global deployment of soft power resources through 
foreign direct investment, trade, and foreign aid to build the PRC economy, bide time and avoid 
military conflict with the sole superpower until an increasingly multipolar international system 
emerges which might become increasingly favorable to PRC interests.  This long-term strategy 
finances China's gradual, (though intensifying) massive military buildup and solidifies regional 
hard power projection capabilities in East Asia.  If the initial U.S. approach to soft power was 
"winning the peace" after World War II, then the Chinese soft power approach might be 
considered "maintaining the harmony" abroad to avoid global conflict while consolidating power 
in its own hemisphere.  To achieve this, China executes a “hemispheric hedging” strategy, which 
will be discussed later at length.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 Thirdly, and most importantly, Nye focuses almost exclusively on enumerating soft 
power resources rather than elaborating on how those soft power resources should be utilized. 
This analytical oversight is ironic given Nye's primary critique of the realist school of 
international relations theory is its tendency to focus far too heavily on the enumeration and 
empirical measurement of hard power resources.  Even when discussing the three primary 
resources of soft power, Nye offers conditions upon which of these resources may or may not 
achieve an outcome: 
   "The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in 
   places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to 
   them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as 
   legitimate and having moral authority."   66!
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While China's soft power may currently lag behind that of the U.S. and other developed Western 
nations, the PRC has been successfully deploying soft power resources to achieve measurable 
outcomes and only when it is in the national interest to do so.  Nye himself has been wrongly 
dismissive of China's growing soft power by focusing on the limited supply of Chinese soft 
power which, according to Nye, results from its authoritarian domestic political model, rather 
than the manner in which that soft power resource supply is utilized.    Nye's analysis is the 67
equivalent to saying a quarterback that only throws 10 passes in a football game, but completes 9 
of 10 for 250 yards and 3 touchdowns is not playing the game well.  To further the analogy, its 
not the supply of opportunities that matters, its how one chooses to use those opportunities–the 
utility–that matters.  Scholars and policymakers have noted that China has been deliberately 
pragmatic in its approach to soft power pursuits in various regions in recent years.    This paper 68
holds that, because China focuses its soft power resources on utility of those resources,   rather 69
than the  supply of resources in and of themselves, China achieves more desirable policy 
outcomes.  Chinese scholars have even discussed this pragmatic nature of PRC soft power 
pursuits: 
   "Chinese foreign policy has attempted to reassure others of its non- 
   threatening intent, enhance acceptance by the international community, 
   and proactively realign the international environment to its liking.  It is 
   with these goals in mind that the instruments of soft power are conceived 
   and pursued.  Some of these are more 'natural' insofar as they extend from the 
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   domestic path of reforms and opening up since the the late 1970s.  Other soft 
   power practices, however, result from more deliberate choices."   70!
Furthermore, China's utility of soft power based on self-interest makes the case that soft power is 
best explained under the theoretical umbrella of realism, rather than liberal internationalism as 
suggested by Nye.  In many ways, Chinese soft power should be considered a pursuit of what 
noted realist E.H. Carr called the "harmony of interests."   This turn of phrase by Carr is 71
strikingly similar to one coined by former Chinese President Hu Jintao called "harmonious 
world": 
   "...even though our world has different contradiction and conflicts, and there are 
   an increasing number of factors concerning instability and uncertainty, peace and 
   development remain the themes of the present era. The world needs peace, the 
   people want cooperation and nations long for development. These are the 
   irresistible trends of our times.”   72!
This pursuit of harmony at home and abroad has recently been a priority among PRC leadership 
as China negotiates the trajectories of its global rise to power. 
!
THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE SOFT POWER IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
 In November of 2004, while the United States had its political and foreign policy focus 
on the Iraq War, something relatively new was occurring in China.  PRC President Hu Jintao was 
making his first state visit to Latin America, a region traditionally thought of as America's 
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“backyard” under the Monroe Doctrine.  While the American media was paying close attention 
to the electoral aftermath of a U.S. presidential election and the ongoing war and 
counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, China was taking advantage of newfound international 
opportunities.  In a speech to the Brazilian National Congress Hu made this quite clear: 
   "Sino-Latin American co-operation is facing an unprecedented historical 
   opportunity. We should seize it and work side-by-side to push this friendly co- 
   operation towards continuous progress."    73!
Hu's trip to the region lasted twelve days and included state visits to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Cuba, and attending the 12th Summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) 
in Santiago.  The Chinese Foreign Minister noted the trip's successes and explained to the 
accompanying media that the visit: 
   "reaches the goal of expanding consensus, enhancing mutual trust, 
   exploring cooperation and seeking common development...This visit lays 
   a new foundation, opens up a new situation and injects new vitality into 
   the development of China-Latin America traditional friendly ties...President Hu 
   held candid and in-depth talks with the leaders of the four countries on 
   consolidating the traditional friendship and strengthening mutually beneficial 
   cooperation in the new situation. The two sides deepen political mutual trust and 
   expand the consensus of enhanced cooperation. President Hu declared with 
   President Lula that both sides will replenish and deepen China-Brazil strategic 
   partnership, determined together with President Kirchner the launch and 
   development of China-Argentine strategic partnership, decided with President 
   Lagos to upgrade China-Chile all-round cooperative partnership and confirmed 
   with President Fidel Castro to continuously consolidate and develop China-Cuba 
   traditional friendly cooperation. All this lays a solid foundation for China to 
   develop long-term and stable all-round friendly cooperation with the four 
   countries.   74!
Does Hu's trip to Latin America mark the beginnings of Chinese soft power pursuits?  Not at all, 
but it marked the quietest major hemispheric shift in international politics of the twenty-first 
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century.  The PRC was very clearly sending the message that it desired global power status and, 
again undercutting Nye's thesis on soft power, it would pursue soft power when it was in China's 
national interest to do so.  This "utility of scale,” as this paper holds and Chinese scholars 
confirm, is the key to China's soft power successes.    The timing of the trip tells much about the 75
PRC willingness to escalate soft power pursuits rooted in national interest in a part of the world 
traditionally viewed as America's backyard under the Monroe Doctrine.  
 The fact that the U.S. was embroiled in two major conflicts in Central Asia and the 
Middle East when Hu made this historic trip to Latin America should not remain unexamined: if 
the PRC desires global great power status, there would likely not be a better opportunity to serve 
PRC national interests than when the world's superpower was devoting precious attention and 
scarce resources to fight two wars abroad and their influence and popularity in their own 
"backyard" was at an all-time low.      If we are to believe that China's expansion into Latin 76 77
America and the Western Hemisphere at this particular moment in history is indeed 
happenstance, perhaps we should consider the trajectory of U.S.-Latin American relations just 
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THE DECLINE OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN ITS "BACKYARD"   
 Building upon their newfound friendship, newly elected President George W. Bush and 
newly elected Mexican President Vicente Fox quickly developed a bilateral commission in 2001 
to negotiate a deal on many of the countries' shared policy concerns including curbing illegal 
immigration, improving trade ties, and cooperation on fighting drug trafficking.  The two leaders 
met twice in April and June of 2001.   
 On September 6, 2001, in a joint appearance on the White House lawn, President Bush 
declared the twenty-first century the "Century of the Americas."   The following day, President 78
Fox gave a speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress and was given a standing ovation. 
Obviously, U.S. attention shifted away to other priorities after the events of the week that 
followed.  A National Public Radio news correspondent stationed in Latin America noted: "it was 
as if Latin America had been cast into some permanent twilight, semi-forgotten even as 
extraordinary events unfolded."    As U.S. interests shifted to fighting terrorism and its state 79
sponsors in the Middle East and Central Asia, promises made to improve relations with the Latin 
American region came apart at the seams.  This is not to suggest the shift in U.S. interests was 
not justified, but rather, to acknowledge the shift in strategic focus had consequences (whether 
intended or not) in other areas.    In sum, an influence vacuum in the region began to open-up in 
2004 and China sought to fill it.   David Fleischer, a political scientist at the University of 
Brasilia put it this way:  
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   “…Latin America was totally forgotten…A lot of Latin Americans thought 
   that was great: better to be forgotten than be taken care of too much. The 
   U.S. opened a void, and the Chinese came right in.”   80!
 However, this recent history was not the sole reason for decline of U.S. leadership and 
influence in the region.  It was merely the crescendo.  The story of the decline of U.S. influence 
in Latin America has roots dating back to the Cold War and its aftermath.  The United States and 
the Soviet Union fought critical, ideologically-charged proxy battles for influence across much of 
the developing world during the period between 1946 and the fall of the Soviet Union, including 
many across Latin America. During this period, the U.S. funneled support to governments and 
guerillas fighting against leftist factions across Latin America thought by the U.S. to be 
expanding communist influence in the region after the Castro victory of 1959 in Cuba.  Whether 
Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, or, most famously Cuba, the proxy struggles between the 
Superpowers during the Cold War were clearly evident in the U.S. "backyard."  After the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc, the U.S. embarked on a renewed approach to revitalizing 
and reopening many of the closed economies of Latin America.  Utilizing normative, 
Washington-based international institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) the U.S. promoted the so-called "Washington Consensus" to bridle the 
nations of the region willing to liberalize their economies, remove barriers to trade, and reduce 
the role of the state in economic activity.    The reduction in trade barriers clearly helped some 81
Latin American countries during the 2000-2008 capital flight from equity markets to 
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commodities.  It can also be argued the Washington Consensus helped to improve trade between 
the U.S. and Latin America through multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements.  In 1990, 
U.S.-Latin American trade amounted to $118 billion. By 2000, it had grown to $380 billion and, 
in 2008, to more than $665 billion.    While this appears to be excellent news for U.S. interests at 82
face value, the most interesting aspect of these numbers lies in the trade balance trend between 
the U.S. and Latin America.  In 1990, less than 40 percent of U.S. exports went to Latin America 
but that number grew to 22 percent in 2000 and again to 24 percent in 2010.    But how did 83
trade-flow the opposite direction look?   
 In 1990, Latin American exports were highly valued by the U.S., accounting for 47 
percent of Latin American exports.  That momentum continued and the U.S. accounted for 56 
percent of Latin American exports in 2000. But over the next decade, the U.S. began to weaken 
as a destination for Latin American exports.  Very noticeable changes began to emerge in 2009, 
as the number fell to 39 percent of exports worth $285 billion.   Without question, the dip in 
2009 most certainly correlates with the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, but the number crept 
only crept back up to 42 percent, or $361 billion in 2010.   
 Latin American export diversification was well underway: China's share of Latin 
American exports exploded from 0.8% in 1990 to 10% in 2008.    The United States was 84
becoming less and less important to Latin America and China was becoming increasingly 
important. Table 1.1   reflects this; while the U.S. remains the top trading partner for South and 85
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Central America, the important trends should be noted.  Between 2000-2009 South American and 
Central American exports to the U.S. dropped more than 10 percent in all but three countries.  In 
sharp contrast, China became a top export destination for South and Central American countries 
during this time period, netting a greater than 10 percent increase from all but three nations. 
Commenting on the "Washington Consensus" and its place in the big picture of emerging 
markets, former President Hu Jintao said: "Global institutions had failed to fully reflect the 
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TABLE 1.1  Changes in Latin American Export Patterns to Primary 
Destinations Between 2000-2009 in Percentage of Total Exports 

















Argentina 3.0 6.6 9.4 15.3 12.0 6.2 18.0 18.6 48.1 42.2
Bolivia 0.4 2.5 1.4 18.5 24.0 7.7 17.3 9.1 44.2 59.9
Brazil 2.0 13.2 10.3 26.1 24.3 10.2 28.0 22.2 24.8 20.1
Chile 5.0 23.2 26.1 46.1 16.5 11.3 25.2 19.6 21.9 19.1
Colombia 0.2 2.9 2.6 6.0 50.4 39.7 13.9 14.2 28.9 24.6
Ecuador 1.2 0.9 10.9 2.6 37.9 33.5 12.9 15.0 31.5 42.6
Paraguay 0.7 1.1 2.0 1.1 3.9 1.8 13.6 16.0 74.5 75.1
Peru 6.4 15.4 16.9 26.9 28.0 16.3 22.0 15.6 18.1 14.9
Uruguay 4.0 4.3 8.3 8.5 8.3 3.3 16.3 15.1 54.2 39.9















Costa Rica 0.2 8.8 5.5 17.7 52.0 35.8 22.1 17.4 19.0 27.3
El Salvador 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.8 65.5 46.6 5.7 5.8 27.8 43.5
Guatemala 0.1 0.4 3.6 3.2 44.0 42.5 10.9 5.5 35.6 40.1
Honduras 0.0 1.5 1.6 4.7 79.3 40.7 4.5 23.0 6.0 29.8
Mexico 0.2 0.6 1.4 2.4 88.2 87.6 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.2
Nicaragua 0.0 – 0.8 2.5 57.2 29.5 16.4 13.3 23.4 68.1
Panama 0.2 2.5 2.0 8.2 45.9 42.6 21.7 24.4 23.2 19.5
Source: Fornes, Gaston and Alan Butt Philip. 2012. The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging Markets and the 
Future of Globalization. London: Palgrave Macmillan
            Decrease of  >10%                   Increase of  >10%
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S SOFT POWER INFLUENCE IN THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE !
 Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power in mainland China in 1949, 
PRC foreign policy toward the developing world has progressed through three stages and has 
trended toward pragmatism over time.   
 From 1949 until the end of the Cultural Revolution, China's foreign policy with the 
developing world was guided by Maoist ideology.  China viewed world order through the lens of 
Mao Zedong's "Three Worlds Theory" which held that the two Superpowers–the United States 
and the Soviet Union–made up the "first world," China and the remainder of the developing 
world in Africa, Latin America, and Asia comprised the "third world," and the developed, non-
Superpower nations were the "second world."    During this period, China's foreign policy 87
toward the developing world was comprised of large foreign aid packages and exporting 
communist revolution.  Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the PRC provided aid to these 
"brothers of the third world" in exchange for the diplomatic support needed by the then largely 
isolated PRC.     88
 From the mid-1970s until the end of the Cold War, China's foreign policy with the 
developing world became more pragmatic, concordantly with the Deng Xiaoping reform era. 
Because Deng's approach was less ideological, the developing world became less a centerpiece 
as economic reforms began to take hold and the PRC turned away from the idea of exporting 
revolution and began to postulate the idea of a "peaceful rise." 
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 Since the end of the Cold War, as the structure of the international system has undergone 
significant change, China has sought to rekindle and strengthen its diplomatic, economic, and 
strategic ties to the developing world, but through an evermore pragmatic, soft power dynamic 
that focuses on China's self interest and its global rise.  Across the developing world, particularly, 
where nations feel alienated by U.S. foreign policy, there is a noticeable uptick in Chinese 
cultural, diplomatic and economic activity.  Many of these countries, including those across Latin 
America, are increasingly attracted to a rising and powerful China both as an economic 
opportunity and a potential transformative alternative to the Washington Consensus that could 
shape the future of the international system by nudging its structure in the multipolar direction.  89
These measures of attraction are very clearly soft power resources China has used to advance its 
national interest.  
 Sino-Latin American relations has mirrored this trajectory.  During much of the Cold 
War, China's relationships in the region were driven by ideological alignment and centered on 
symbolic diplomatic support and shared ideology.  When China began its "opening up" and 
domestic economic reforms of the Deng era, it mirrored the approach with the rest of its "third 
world brothers" and relationships in the region trended toward pragmatism.  At the end of the 
Cold War, as democratization took hold in many parts of Latin America, China began pursuing 
relations in the region for economic and strategic reasons and despite a continued economic 
presence by the United States, many nations across South America, Latin America and the 
Caribbean have taken a long lens view of China’s burgeoning role in the region.  China’s soft 
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power in Latin America should be examined from multiple angles to adequately understand how 
the PRC has expanded its influence throughout the region.  
!!
CHINA: LATIN AMERICA'S APPEAL AND PRC SOFT POWER RESOURCE  !
DEPLOYMENT IN LATAM    90
   
  "South America is going to be the hot spot for Chinese investment in the coming 
  ten years...Entreprenuers who want to 'challenge the blue ocean' should be ready 
  to go to South America"  -Chen Yuan, President, China Development Bank   91
   
 In 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 
held hearings to examine the significance of Chinese influence in the Latin American region and 
determined that U.S. power, position, and influence remained superior to China and that PRC 
economic engagement did not represent a threat to U.S. security.    While this author contends 92
that 2005 and 2013 reflect very different answers to the strategic questions surrounding the 
burgeoning Chinese influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, we must first examine why 
China believes its national interest is best served by expanding foreign policy and soft power 
influence in the "U.S. backyard" and understand how its national interests vary by the regions of 
Latin America in which they are pursued. 
 Without question, a primary reason for China’s expanded soft power influence into the 
Western hemisphere is to further expand its explosive economic growth by expanding trade with 
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the Latin American region.  As China strives toward great power status, the CCP leadership 
remains very conscious of how intimately connected its economic power is with its global rise. 
Since 1989, China has sustained annual GDP growth averages in excess of 9.3% and in 2010 the 
PRC economy, at $5.88 trillion, was more than one-third the U.S. economy and overtook Japan 
as the world's second largest economic power.  Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, PRC 
economic growth had accelerated to more than 11 percent per year.  China's economic growth 
rate eased down to 7.9% or $8.28 trillion in 2012 but remains on track to make it the world's 
largest economy at lease by 2027, according to Jim O'Neill head of global asset management at 
Goldman Sachs.      With respect to emerging markets, and Latin America specifically, China 93 94
seeks regional strategic partnerships that will support its need for the natural resources and raw 
materials required to build and grow the Chinese economy.  Because the growth of its economy 
has centered on exports abroad, many of the emergent economic sectors in the Chinese economy 
are highly interconnected to foreign markets.  This proclivity toward exports is evident in PRC 
trade surpluses with much of the world.  While these trade surpluses remain significant, it should 
be noted they are trending downward. In 2007, China had a net trade surplus of $262.2 billion.  95
In 2010, China's trade exceeded $2.97 trillion its trade surplus fell to $183.1 billion. Chinese 
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manufacturing is heavily dependent upon primary product and raw materials inputs, much of 
which must be imported from abroad.   
 Secondly, China views Latin America as a potential market for Chinese goods and 
deploys soft power to ensure current markets are protected and new markets may be acquired. 
Because the Chinese economy has relied so heavily on its exports to drive economic growth, it 
makes sound sense for China to continuously diversify its export markets.  The 2008 global 
financial crisis, caused primarily by risky U.S. mortgage loans bundled and packaged into debt 
securities and sold into markets around the world, emboldened China's need to diversify its 
export markets away from their U.S. consumer-heavy dependence in order to sustain economic 
growth.    As the financial and liquidity crisis deepened, it resulted in economic contraction 96
among the developed countries including China's largest export customers, the U.S. and Europe. 
Economic contraction meant less consumer spending and, therefore, less demand for Chinese 
exports.  Additionally, the Chinese import presence in developed countries often leads to 
domestic manufacturing job losses, accompanied by domestic political pressure to intervene.  As 
foremost Chinese scholar on Sino-Latin American relations, Jiang notes: 
     
   "China views the United States as a country that uses its economic 
   leverage to exert political pressure on China, which is one reason 
   that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships...Latin America 
   with a population of more than 500 million and an economy of nearly $3 trillion, 
   is an attractive market for Chinese products.”   97!
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The value orientation of many Latin American consumers makes the low prices of Chinese-
manufactured goods increasingly affordable and desirable.  Even more expensive goods such as 
vehicles and computers offer the Latin American consumer choices and options.  In addition to 
the traditional products, many Latin American markets offer new avenues for informal, 
contraband Chinese products that violate intellectual property rights, an increasingly serious 
point of contention between the U.S. and China.        98 99
 Thirdly, the PRC deploys soft power resources through foreign direct investment (FDI), 
foreign aid, and loan programs in the region.  Latin America and the Caribbean combine to make 
the region the second largest recipient of PRC overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
between 2000-2011.    According the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank:  100
   “Since 2005, China has upwards of $87 billion in loan commitments to 
   Latin American countries. China’s loan commitments of $37 billion in 
   2010 were more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American 
   Development Bank, and U.S. Export-Import Bank combined.”   101!!
To suggest that such programs do not lend themselves to attractive power falls prey to Nye’s 
limited definition of the soft power concept.  Why would Chinese FDI be so much more 
attractive to countries across Latin America rather than U.S. FDI?  For several decades the 
region, particularly portions of Central and South America have sought to shake the influence of 
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the United States and neoliberal western institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  Many leaders across the region see, in China, an increasingly exemplary 
development model competing directly with U.S. power and influence across the world, and 
foreign aid and development programs that do not interfere with domestic affairs and come with 
fewer democratic strings attached.    Interestingly, upon former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 102
state visits to the region in 2004, the previous three years had seen FDI in Latin America 
plummet from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003.     103
 Lastly, while China's soft power presence in Latin America and the Caribbean may 
appear solely driven by economic rationale, the strategic implications and partnerships cannot be 
ignored, firstly, because the Chinese government views the region through a strategic lens.  PRC 
government documents fully support this premise:  
   “the Chinese government regards China-Latin American relations from a 
   strategic perspective, and devotes itself to establishing and developing 
   comprehensive cooperation partnerships of equality and mutual benefit 
   and the collaborative development with the Latin American and Caribbean 
   nations.”   104!
Military-to-military exchanges, nuclear and other high-technology agreements, have become an 
increasingly mitigating factor in the region.  Also, a centerpiece of Chinese engagement across 
the region is to support its "One China" policy by pursuing diplomatic relations with certain 
nations to further isolate Taiwan.  More than half of the countries around the world whom 
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diplomatically recognize Taiwan are located in Latin America and the Caribbean and, as we will 
see, China aggressively courts these countries with diplomatic and soft power fervor.  These 
aggressive soft power moves have strategic implications for east Asia and in the western 
hemisphere.  The PRC strengthening its “One China” policy by weakening Taiwan’s diplomatic 
allies has very clear political and strategic implications for east Asia and cross-strait relations.   
 Having shown Nye’s definition of soft power to be unnecessarily limited by its 
discounting the attractive nature of economic power, additional strategic implications of China’s 
soft power influence in Latin America come to light.  These strategic implications demonstrate 
the “hemispheric hedging” smart power strategy the PRC is increasingly executing successfully. 
China has increased military-to-military engagement and cooperation in the region and has 
developed aerospace, military, and space cooperation with certain countries in the region.  China 
has very aggressively sought to build an alternative to the Panama canal through Nicaragua. 
Each of these developments has peripheral strategic implications for the western hemisphere. 
China’s core regional focus is raw materials acquisition and natural resource production, trade, 
and expanding its export markets, all to support its economic growth.  However, as China 
continues to parlay its economic growth for the expansion of its military size, scope, and 
capabilities in east Asia, then it should follow that soft power deployment in the western 






LATIN AMERICA: THE DRAGON’S ATTRACTION 
 The magnetism of China for the Latin American region is two-fold.  First, Chinese 
economic growth provides a massive market for Latin American nations with commodity supply 
and export capabilities.  China’s demand for agricultural commodities and other raw materials to 
support their economic growth has skyrocketed in recent years and countries across Latin 
America have aggressively sought to meet it.  Many maintain a bullish outlook on the benefits of 
this commodity boom for the Latin American region.  Ironically, many neoliberal western 
institutions, deemed a structural part of the Washington Consensus such as The World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, have agreed with ideologically-opposed leftist nations of the 
region and openly declared the commodities demand boom and increased economic engagement 
by China a critical component of continued Latin American development.  Others are far more 
bearish–arguing the proponents of engagement with China are overly optimistic  –and the 105
commodities boom has created too broad a dependence on China as an export market for a 
region that historically has failed to measurably diversify its economic output.  That is, Latin 
America has always produced commodities for export and has done so well.  These critics argue 
the China commodities boom has not helped Latin America to the extent many believe, has 
lessened the region’s ability to diversify its economies and has failed to guard against the 
dumping of Chinese products on Latin American shores.  Ultimately, critics believe this is 
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harming domestic Latin American manufacturing, further lessening the region’s ability to 
diversify its economic output.   106
 Secondly, many Latin American countries view China as an alternative development 
model to U.S. free market capitalism and the neoliberal “Washington Consensus.”    This is 107
particularly the case in countries across the region who have taken a political turn to the left in 
the last decade.    Since the election of Hugo Chàvez in Venezuela in 1998, Latin America has 108
experienced unprecedented electoral victories for the political left.  Although many of the 
following are more pragmatic than Chàvez’s Bolivarian leftist vision, these political victories 
include Nèstor Kirchner (2003) and Cristina Fernàndez de Kirchner (2007 and 2011) of 
Argentina, Luis Inàcio (Lula) de Silva (2002 and 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2011) of Brazil, 
Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet of Chile (2000 and 2005 respectively), Evo Morales of 
Bolivia (2005 and 2009), Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua (2006 and 2011), Rafael Correa of Ecuador 
(2007 and 2013) and others have expanded their economic and strategic relationships with 
China, at least in part, to demonstrate that Latin America, as a region, no longer needs the United 
States in order to thrive.  This is not entirely a logical assumption, but does make for sound 
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domestic political rhetoric for leftist leaders in a region that has sought to shrug-off U.S. 
influence.     109
!
SOUTH AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CONE AND CHINA 
 Economic calculations, driven by raw materials and commodities, dominate the 
relationships between Southern Cone nations and China.  Two countries (Argentina and Brazil) 
of the four Latin American nations with whom the PRC has signed “strategic partnership” 
agreements (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico) call South America’s Southern Cone region 
home.  Brazil and Argentina receive the “strategic partner” designation by PRC leadership for 
their ability to export commodities and other high-value raw materials vital to Chinese economic 
growth.  The commodities boom in South America from 2000-2008, largely driven by Chinese 
consumption, has clearly benefitted the region in many respects, but much debate persists among 
Latin American and Chinese scholars and experts with respect to the cost versus the benefits to 
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BRAZIL 
 China and Brazil have both evolved into emerging capitalist economies as members of 
the BRICS bloc and each have chosen to orient themselves toward global markets, rather than 
remaining strictly tethered to their respective regional markets in Latin America and East Asia. 
This desire for a multipolar global order will remain a primary strategic point of alignment for 
the two nations as they (and the rest of the BRICS) continue their respective rising.  Brazil and 
China established official diplomatic relations in 1974, making Brazil one of China’s oldest 
trading partners in the Latin American region and the preponderant regional economic player for 
China. Brazil is the region’s largest exporter to China, representing 36% of total Latin American 
exports.  Brazilian economic growth between 1951 and 1980 averaged 6.8 percent annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) and reached an astonishing 11.2 percent between 1968-1974.    This 111
exponential economic growth emboldened the Emìlio Mèdici-led Brazilian government 
(1969-1974) to formulate a development plan with specific targets to expand reach into the 
global markets and established the primary goal for “integration into the network of developed 
countries by the end of the 20th century.”    After the Cold War ended, Brazil began to 112
reevaluate its diplomatic positions and, in 1993 under then Brazilian President Itamar Franco, 
made Asia a top diplomatic priority.  During that same year, China declared Brazil a “strategic 
partner” making it the first Latin American nation to be granted such a designation.  While China 
and Brazil experienced a sporadic on-again-off-again history as modest trading partners, it was 
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not until this designation and China’s subsequent engagement in the region beginning in 2000 
that this bilateral relationship truly began to blossom.  Former Chinese President Hu’s 2004 trip 
to Brazil and subsequent talks with Brazilian President Luis Inàcio Lula de Silva formed the 
foundation of the current cooperative relationship between the two largest BRIC nations and 
current Chinese President Xi Jinping and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff have continued this 
strategic partnership.    
 According to the Brazilian central bank, trade with China has increased $68.78 billion 
over a nine year period, from $6.68 billion in 2003 to $75.46 billion in 2012.    In 2009, China 113
surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s number one trading partner, likely prompting U.S. concerns that 
resulted in a state visit to Brazil by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2011.  
 China has specific economic interest in Brazilian commodities and raw materials.  Most 
Brazilian agricultural commodity exports to China are soybeans and soy oils.  In 2006 Brazilian 
soybean exports to China amounted to eleven million tons, up 100 percent over the previous two-
year span.    Global demand for Brazilian soy in 2013 is at an all-time high, largely driven by 114
insatiable Chinese consumption for foodstuffs.  Though Brazil leaped the U.S. as the world’s 
largest producer of soy in 2013, it has exposed Brazil’s “decrepit” infrastructure   weaknesses 115
and challenged Brazilian capability to reliably deliver increasingly high volumes of raw 
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commodities to market.  Over the last twenty years, Brazil has tripled its capacity at the nation’s 
largest port, Santos, and still demand has continued to outpace improvements to transportation 
infrastructure.    In December 2012, President Dilma Rousseff announced a $26 billion 116
investment package to modernize Brazil’s ports in response to global demand for the nation’s 
rich agricultural products.    However, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 117
Report for 2013-2014 ranks Brazil’s overall quality of infrastructure at 114th of 148 other 
nations, a pitiful showing for a country with such strong export strength.  Chile, Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Suriname, Guyana, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Peru, and Nicaragua all rank higher than Brazil for their overall infrastructure 
quality.   118
 While agricultural commodities dominate trade with Brazil, this may soon be eclipsed by 
PRC interest in Brazilian oil.  Recent offshore discoveries have made Brazil a significant oil 
exporter.    As of 2012, China has provided more than $10.3 billion in loans to Petrobras (the 119
Brazilian state-owned oil company) to develop and operate Brazil’s precious Pre-Salt Oil Fields 
offshore.    This impressive level of investment was offered in return for the promise of 120
Brazilian exports from the project’s production.   
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As of 2013, all four of China’s state oil firms have a strong position in Brazil totaling more than 
$17 billion in total investments since 2010.    These developments in China’s deepwater oil and 121
gas drilling capabilities has strategic implications for its own hemisphere given China’s 
increasing willingness to flex its military muscle over maritime territorial disputes with its 
neighbors.   122
 While trade has dominated China’s priorities in Brazil, the aforementioned infrastructure 
deficiencies among other factors have lead to an unprecedented increase in Chinese FDI.  By 
helping upgrade Brazilian infrastructure, China reinforces its ability to extract raw materials and 
natural resources with increasing efficiency.  In 2012, former Premier Wen Jiabao visited 
multiple Latin American countries and suggested the creation of a China-LATAM cooperative 
forum.  To spur the discussion, Wen offered an initial $15 billion for infrastructure loans.  123
Chinese FDI in Brazil has increased rapidly between 2007-2012. 
 Levels of Sino-Brazilian strategic and military cooperation are increasing and can be 
correlated with increased bilateral economic interaction.  In 2009, the Chinese and Brazilian 
militaries signed a five-point consensus on military to military cooperation including increasing 
military bilateral personnel exchanges, coordinating on peacekeeping operations, and enhancing 
collaboration on military industrial science and technology.    This consensus established the 124
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Joint Commission on the Exchanges and Cooperation Between the Chinese and Brazilian 
Defense Ministries.    In 2013, Chinese naval warships visited multiple ports in South America 125
including Chile, Brazil, and Argentina.  Additionally, Brazil and China have jointly launched 
earth resources satellites for the monitoring of natural resources, agricultural and urban 
development zones.    Of these developments, the naval military-to-military exchanges may be 126
the most significant and signal growing capabilities and strategic cooperation.  
!
ARGENTINA 
 China and Argentina established official diplomatic ties in 1972 when Argentina dropped 
its recognition of Taiwan in exchange for recognition of Beijing, twenty-three years after the 
Chinese Communist Revolution.  In the early years of their very limited bilateral relationship, the 
two countries built mutual trust with one another by turning a blind eye to their respective 
domestic politics.  China stayed out of human rights issues concerning the military dictatorship 
ruling Argentina at the time.  Argentina was the first member of the international community to 
send a presidential delegation to China despite the diplomatic isolation following the infamous 
Tienanmen Square protest crackdown in 1989.    While the bilateral relationship has a history of 127
high-level visits to promote trust, the economic and strategic relationship has grown in 
accordance with China’s level of interest and engagement with the LATAM region.  In June 
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2004, Argentine President President Nèstor Kirchner lead a large delegation of more than 270 
businessmen, ministers, and provincial governors on an official state visit to China in hopes of 
expanding the political, economic, and trade parameters between the two countries.    After a 128
week of bilateral talks, the two nations signed their first series of five cooperative agreements 
covering the “civil aviation transportation, co-operation in public health and medical sciences, 
cultural co-operation, investment and agriculture” sectors.   When Chinese President Hu Jintao 129
made his first trip to Latin America in November 2004, the two nations signed agreements that 
resulted in $20 billion in PRC investment commitments over ten years.   130
 Similar to Brazil, much of Argentina’s trade relationship with China centers on its ability 
to export commodities to meet Chinese consumption and demand.  China is Argentina’s second 
largest trading partner and the largest buyer of agricultural commodities and, in 2011, bilateral 
trade was valued at $14.8 billion.    Argentina is the world’s third largest soy producer and, 131
although second in the region only to Brazil, Argentine soy exports to the PRC boast a 
nonetheless impressive percentage of 23 percent of Chinese soy imports.    Additionally, 132
Argentina is the second largest global producer of corn.  In recent years, Argentine soy 
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production has catapulted the country into the good graces of global markets.  The 2013-2014 
Argentine soy crop is estimated at 57.5 million tons, or more than 20 percent of all global 
soybean production,    largely driven by Chinese demand.  Despite its niche in the soybean and 133
agricultural export markets, Argentina’s increasing willingness to allow Chinese foreign 
investment when combined with the world’s third largest shale gas reserves, has produced 
significant growth in the country’s oil and gas sector.   
 China’s increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in Argentina over the last decade in the 
energy and infrastructure sectors has been the most significant bilateral development.  Much like 
their Brazilian neighbors, Argentina has vast commodity production and supply with outdated, 
crumbling infrastructure by which to transport it.  New deals in 2012 and 2013 notwithstanding, 
Argentina has attracted the third largest levels of Chinese FDI in Latin America according to the 
Inter-American Dialogue’s China-Latin America finance database.    These deals consisted of 134
four loans totaling $11.8 billion between 2010-2011, all infrastructure investments in light, 
subway, and high-speed rail systems.    Additionally, in 2013, Chinese FDI has included multi-135
billion dollar deals in freight rail and hydroelectric power.   Argentina’s President Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner recently nationalized two freight rail lines to finalize $2.1 billion of PRC 
loan commitments to Argentina to upgrade the nation’s freight rail system from the Andes 
foothills in the north all the way to the Atlantic coast, cutting commodities transportation costs 
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and expediting China’s ability to extract raw materials at an even quicker pace.    The fact that 136
the Argentine head of state would nationalize the nation’s freight rail infrastructure in order to 
secure PRC financing for the upgrade project demonstrates precisely how strong Chinese soft 
power is in Latin America.     
 In accordance with the “big picture” of global energy demand, Argentina has begun to 
aggressively seek investment to explore many of its vast, yet untapped oil and gas reserves. 
Regional supply and demand trends and projections indicate that in the two-decade period from 
1990-2010, oil and gas demand has decreased in the Americas and has shifted toward Asia, 
largely driven by Chinese economic growth.  This trend is expected to continue as Asian demand 
is projected to cut demand in the Americas in half between 2010-2030.    However, over the 137
same span from 2010-2030, Asian supply is projected to diminish and North and South American 
supply is projected to continue rising as the technological applications of horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing have made previously untapped shale oil and gas reserves recoverable.  This 
surge of production and supply in the Americas is expected to make the region competitive with, 
if not superior to, the Middle East.    In the case of Argentina, oil and natural gas exports to 138
China represented a very modest 7.7 percent of total exports to the PRC in 2004.    There are 139
signs that this number will increase significantly due to Chinese investment.  In 2010, CNOOC 
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Ltd., one of China’s state-owned oil firms purchased a $3.1 billion stake in a unit of Bridas 
Energy Holdings LLC, to boost exploration and production.  The deal, coined “a beachhead in 
Latin America,”   made CNOOC a 50% stakeholder in Bridas Corp. which conducts oil and gas 140
exploration in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.    This was followed by another 2010 deal when 141
China Petrochemical Corp. purchased Occidental Petroleum’s Argentine operations for $2.45 
billion.   Argentina’s need to explore domestic reserves has even more become apparent.  In 142
2012, the resource-rich nation officially became a net importer of oil and gas for the first time in 
twenty years, largely due to poor domestic energy policy, and has since aggressively sought after 
multi-billion dollar Chinese investments in the oil and gas sectors.  
 In recent years, Chinese state telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE have also 
expanded their interest into the robust Argentine telecommunications and space industries while 
U.S. companies have fled the country due the economic instability that followed Argentina’s 
deep economic crisis in 2002.    PLA connections to the Chinese telecommunications 143
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CHILE 
 In many ways Chile has positioned itself as a leader among Latin American countries in 
its bilateral economic ties with the PRC, since becoming the first LATAM nation to grant 
diplomatic recognition to the PRC in 1970.  Its geographic position along the Pacific coast is 
ideal for Asia-Pacific trade and is among the most stable and prosperous nations of the LATAM 
region.  Notably, Chile holds the top spot in Latin America for human development, income-per-
capita, and economic freedom.    The overall maturity of Chile’s commercial infrastructure for 144
conducting business has facilitated the Chile-China relationship through the establishment of 
professional cooperative non-governmental organizations such as the Chile-China Chamber of 
Commerce and the Chile-China Business Council.   145
 Chile’s geographic comparative advantage enhances PRC ability to extract raw materials 
for its continued economic expansion at reduced costs when compared with other nations of the 
region that lack adequate infrastructure.  Concordantly, Chile is a member of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC)–one of only three Latin American member countries–and  in 
2005, Chile became the first nation in Latin America to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with 
China.    Since the signing of the China-Chile FTA trade increased 22 percent over a seven year 146
span and China became Chile’s top trading partner, overtaking the U.S. in 2007 despite the U.S.-
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Chile FTA also in effect.    In 2012, Chilean exports to China were $18 billion, almost doubling 147
Chile’s exports to the U.S. at $9.4 billion.   While Chile imports more goods from the U.S. than 148
any other country in the region, its export reorientation toward China is reflective of the broad 
regional trends discussed earlier.  In 2012, the two countries agreed to double their bilateral trade 
to $60 billion by 2015.    149
 Chile is the largest copper producer in the world and, unsurprisingly, China is Chile’s 
largest copper customer.  Copper mining provides 20 percent of Chilean GDP and 60 percent of 
total Chilean exports.    China’s domestic economic growth has caused a migratory population 150
shift whereby rural Chinese workers are increasingly moving to the nation’s cities in the east to 
find jobs.  In China, as in other emerging markets, these population shifts have increased the 
global copper demand for everything from electrical wiring, cars, bridges, and almost any other 
aspect of city life that uses electricity.  According to The Economist:  
   “In 2000-05 the government’s income from mining averaged $2.1 billion a 
   year. As Chinese growth accelerated, that rose to $11.5 billion a year 
   between 2005 and 2011. But the boom owed almost everything to the 
   copper price.”   151!
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This phenomenon is precisely where critics of LATAM-Sino relations and its resulting 
commodities boom have valid concerns–a lack of diversity in economic output presents 
precarious problems associated with price volatility if Chinese commodities consumption and 
economic growth slow down.   152
 Chinese foreign direct investment in Chile has been relatively limited.    Between 153
2005-2012, Chinese FDI reached $650 million, consisting of infrastructure investment in 
construction of a 3G communications network,   and a $550 million loan in 2005 to 154
CODELCO, Chile’s state-owned copper mining company, to improve the company’s efficiency 
and technological capabilities.     155
 Beyond the significance of their economic relationship, China and Chile have friendly 
military-to-military relations rooted in their mutual desire to protect maritime trade routes that 
drive the trade flows to and from their nations.  While Chile continues to value their strategic 
relationship with the U.S., these high-level military-to-military interactions should be noted. 
While these interactions have occurred regularly throughout the 2000s, and most recently in 
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2011, the Chinese and Chilean navies recently pledged closer ties and cooperation during talks in 
Beijing,   and conducted a joint naval exercise in Chilean waters in October 2013.   156 157
!!
THE ANDES REGION: NEW PRC PRAGMATISM ENGAGES CHÀVEZ’S BOLÌVARIAN 
LEGACY !
 China’s bilateral relations with the countries of South America’s Andean region has 
focused almost exclusively on acquisition of natural resources.  At first, glance, one might 
suspect a certain amount of ideological alignment to drive bilateral relationships with many of 
the left-leaning nations of the region.  The 1998 election of Hugo Chàvez in Venezuela marked a 
significant shift to the left on the region’s political spectrum.  Over the decade that followed, 
Chàvez exported his populist, socialist vision to neighboring countries with a degree of 
measurable success.  Whereas China would have been more likely to engage a Latin American 
authoritarian political figure like Chàvez as a “brother” of the third world when its relations with 
the region were guided by Maoism’s Three Worlds Theory, today’s Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has opted for pragmatism and stability to build its economic power through natural 
resource extraction.  Virtually every activity China pursues in the Andean region of South 
America centers on oil and gas asset acquisitions and infrastructure investments to secure the 
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VENEZUELA 
 Venezuela and China officially established diplomatic relations in 1974 but the 
relationship lacked significance until charismatic populist Hugo Chàvez assumed the presidency 
in 1998.  China’s relationship with Venezuela expanded significantly under the late Chàvez and 
has further solidified under his successor, Nicolàs Maduro.  Chàvez’s legacy of leftist populism, 
rooted in socialist domestic policy and anti-American foreign policy, has been exported to 
multiple neighboring countries, wielding a great deal of influence in South America and the 
western hemisphere.  While China may have seen some long-term potential for alignment with 
Chàvez ideologically, all signs point toward pragmatism and the “utility of scale” soft power 
approach, despite the significant political risks to China for increased engagement with a 
charismatic political leader such as Chàvez.    
 In Venezuela, China fuels its economic thirst for oil.  An extraordinarily significant, 
though often little understood fact, in 2010 OPEC certified new oil tar sands deposits in 
Venezuela’s resource-rich Orinoco river basin giving Venezuela the world’s largest proven oil 
reserves, leapfrogging Saudi Arabia.  Venezuela’s almost 300 billion barrels of oil equivalent 
(BOE) in proven reserves represented almost one quarter of total OPEC proven reserves at 24.8 
percent by the end of 2012.    Additionally, Venezuela has one of the world’s largest natural gas 158
reserves, and second only to the United States in the western hemisphere, at 148 trillion cubic 
feet.    Given China’s demand for energy to fuel economic growth, and Venezuela’s 159
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extraordinary supply, it is no mistake that the PRC would proactively deploy soft power with its 
designated “strategic partner” Venezuela.   160
 China’s initial appeal for Venezuela was two-fold.  Firstly, building strong bilateral ties 
with China provided Chàvez an opportunity to shake the history of U.S. influence in Latin 
America that he believed had impeded Latin American self-determination for decades.  Just as 
Latin American independence hero Simòn Bolìvar shed the region’s influence of Spain, Chàvez 
hoped to free Latin America from the shackles of the Monroe Doctrine and the Washington 
Consensus to achieve the democratic populist dreams of his Latin American leftist 
forefathers.    To demonstrate that Latin America no longer needed the Washington Consensus, 161
Chàvez believed the Chinese authoritarian development model represented a viable option for 
influence in Latin America that was sufficient for his anti-Americanism.  Secondly, just as the 
PRC was (and still is) proactively seeking energy import markets, Venezuela was (and still is) 
proactively searching for energy In Venezuela, China fuels its economic thirst for oil. export 
markets.  Chàvez hoped to diversify Venezuela’s oil markets away from the United States by 
opening the door to Chinese investment.  Evidence suggests that Venezuela has accomplished 
this to an extent.  Bilateral trade between the two countries was $350 million in 2000 and has 
exploded, reaching $23 billion in 2012 and is expected to reach new heights in 2013.  162
Petroleum exports account for 95 percent of total Venezuelan exports, and as Table 1.1 
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demonstrates, from 2000-2009 total Venezuelan exports to the U.S. dropped 10.8 percent from 
59.6 percent to 48.8 percent.    During this same 2000-2009 period  Venezuelan exports to 163
China increased 2,900 percent.    The U.S. remains Venezuela’s top oil customer, but the trends 164
speak to petroleum export diversification away from the U.S.  In 2007, Chàvez nationalized 
more than $30 billion in oil assets in the OPEC country’s resource-rich Orinoco river basin oil 
field by seizing a majority stake and forcing American multi-national oil giants Conoco-Phillips 
and Exxon-Mobil out of the country.    Despite the surrounding political and financial turmoil 165
caused by Chàvez’s ineffective attempts to use Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to 
fund his populist domestic social welfare programs and despite Chàvez’s March 2013 death,  166
China has remained unwavering in their commitment to protect and secure their substantial 
energy investments in Venezuela.   
 Venezuela is by far the single largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment in 
Latin America and the PRC deploys its “utility of scale” soft power approach to support its 
energy demand objectives.  At a glaring $44.5 billion in 2012, Venezuela has received more than 
3.5 times the amount of Chinese FDI than number two recipient Brazil.    These PRC 167
investments, largely made by the China Development Bank, span the infrastructure, mining, 
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housing, and oil and gas industries.  Interestingly, between 2007-2010 the three largest loans 
have been tied directly to Venezuelan oil flows for export.    Not included in these numbers are 168
Sino-Venezuelan agreements signed by Venezuelan president Maduro and Chinese President Xi 
during Maduro’s state visit to Beijing in September 2013.  These twelve agreements dealt with 
infrastructure improvements, a $5 billion Venezuelan line of credit with China Development 
Bank for social program development, education, and a joint $1.4 billion deal between Chinese 
state-owned oil firm China Petrochemical Corp and Venezuelan state-owned firm PDVSA to 
develop the Junin-1 heavy oil bloc of the Orinoco belt which is expected to produce 200,000 
barrels of oil per day.  Additionally, the Export-Import Bank of China agreed to loan the 
Venezuela state-owned petrochemical company Pequiven $390 for the construction of a new 
port.    Each of these, point to a strategic bilateral partnership that continues to grow to new 169
heights, but some have argued that, due to the financial problems Chàvez policies have caused 
domestically, President Maduro is desperate for cash infusions.   170
 Given the size of trade and investment flows, the strategic implications of the Sino-
Venezuelan relationship deserve examination.  Due to this privileged economic relationship, 
Venezuela has offered Chinese manufacturers favor in strategically sensitive sectors.  For 
example, Venezuela has purchased six K-8 light-attack aircraft and committed to purchase twelve 
more. Additionally, China has built and launched a satellite for Venezuela, reciprocated by 
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Venezuela’s purchase of sophisticated military air-defense radar hardware from China.  In a sign 
of the Chàvez regional influence, longtime Chàvez ally Bolivia purchased six K-8 military 
aircraft and contracted with a Chinese firm to launch a communications satellite.   171
!
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CENTRAL AMERICA & MEXICO 
 China’s soft power objectives in Central America and the Caribbean center on its “One 
China” policy.  Both Central America and small island nations across the Caribbean are critical 
diplomatic battlegrounds with the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan.  Roughly half of the 
remaining nations that diplomatically recognize Taiwan are located in Central America and the 
Caribbean and this guides much of Chinese engagement with the region. 
!
NICARAGUA 
 In 2006, leftist Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega’s victory in the presidential elections in 
Nicaragua led to an immediate reinstatement of relations, albeit not official diplomatic 
recognition, with Beijing, after a fifteen-year hiatus.  While Ortega threatened to remove 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan, he has thus far opted not to do so but rather simply returned 
Nicaragua’s relationship with the PRC to the status it enjoyed during Ortega’s first Presidential 
stint from 1985 to 1990.  As of July 2013, Chinese private and state-owned enterprises have a 
major $40 billion investment plan to construct a new canal through Nicaragua, an unbelievable 
investment considering it is five times more costly than Nicaragua’s annual GDP.  The canal’s 
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capacity will allow for maximum tonnage cargo ships and the development project will be 
managed and controlled by HK Nicaragua Canal Development, a Hong Kong company, and will 
include a transoceanic railway, highway and airport development, oil pipelines, ports on Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts, and free trade zones.    When one considers the history of U.S. influence 172
over the Panama Canal under the Monroe Doctrine, this project gathers increasing strategic 
priority.  China has been exploring ways to cut costs on shipping raw materials and other natural 
resources from the Atlantic coastal regions of Latin America.  A Chinese-controlled canal 
supports their capacity and capability to move products crucial to China’s economic growth in a 
more efficient manner and improve its strategic position in Latin America.    
!
COSTA RICA 
 In 2007, in a surprising and significant diplomatic win for the PRC, Costa Rica became 
the first Central American country to shift its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (ROC) to 
Beijing (PRC).  This development demonstrated the PRC ability to unleash its “utility of scale” 
soft power approach to obtain a very significant policy outcome.   
 Few countries in Latin America have reoriented their trade flows more than Costa Rica. 
In 2000, Costa Rican exports to China consisted of a mere 0.2 percent of total exports.  In 2009, 
after the diplomatic switch from ROC to PRC, Costa Rican exports to China had exploded to 8.8 
percent of total exports, a 4,400 percent increase between 2000-2009.    Morever, during this 173
same time period, Costa Rican exports to the U.S. fell 16.2 percent to 35.8 percent of total 
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exports.  These figures suggest China rewarded Costa Rica handsomely for its historic 
diplomatic switch.   
 Since its diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 2007, China has built and paid $73 million 
for a new Costa Rican 40,000-person capacity national sports stadium and purchased an 
undisclosed percentage of a $300 million Costa Rican bond issue.    Additional aid came from 174
the PRC to Costa Rican disaster relief efforts.   175
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MEXICO 
 If ever there were two countries that one would expect to be economic competitors, it 
would be China and Mexico.  Indeed, there is a substantial, pervasive argument in the literature 
that suggests the consequences of China’s increased engagement with Latin America have been 
the most negative for Mexico.    This strand of the literature holds that Latin America should 176
remain wary of China’s new involvement in the hemisphere and makes three key points: first, 
China has presented an enormous competitive challenge and is interrupting the diversification of 
the Latin American economy in the twenty-first century; second, this competitive challenge to 
economic diversification is is more pronounced in Latin American countries whose product 
exports have diversified from commodities-centric toward higher technology and manufactured 
goods.  Mexico provides the ideal example, and Gallagher and Porzecanski make this case well 
by examining Mexico’s top export categories in 1980, 1990, and 2005.   
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  As Table 1.2 reflects, 
Mexico’s export economy 
diversified significantly over 
this thirty-five year period, 
m o v i n g f r o m s t r i c t l y 
commodit ies exports to 
h i g h e r t e c h n o l o g y 
manufactures.  It is important 
t o n o t e p e t r o l e u m h a s 
remained Mexico’s top 
export, however it is the 
divers i f icat ion that has 
occurred in the subsequent 
nine categories that is most relevant when considering the impact of increased PRC engagement 
with Latin America. 
  China conferred “strategic partner” status on Mexico in 2003 when the bilateral 
relationship began to develop more rapidly.  In 1972, when Mexico formally established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, bilateral trade was a mere $13 million per year but has 
increased exponentially over time.    By 2005, China had become Mexico’s second largest 177
trading partner and between 2000-2009 Mexican exports to China increased by 
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Table 1.2    Mexican Global Exports By Category
Rank
 1980 1990 2005
1 Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum
2 Natural Gas Motor vehicles Motor vehicles
3 Fruit & Vegetables Power generating machinery Telecom equipment
4 Nonferrous metals Fruit & Vegetables TV receivers
5 Coffee & Tea Nonferrous metals Motor vehicle parts
6 Fish Iron and steel Office machines




8 Textile fiber Organic chemicals Trucks
9 Inorganic Chemicals Office machines
Electrical 
machinery
10 Metal Ore Misc. manufactures Electrical circuits
Source:  Gallagher, Kevin P. and Porzecanski, Roberto. 2010. The Dragon in the 
Room: China & the Future of Latin American Industrialization. California: 
Stanford University Press. p. 107. 
!  Ellis p. 200.177
300 percent.    While Mexican exports to China between 2000-2009 follow very similar trends 178
to the rest of Latin America with exponential volume increases to China over that period, Mexico 
is set apart from most of Latin America with respect to its trade with the United States.  Between 
2000-2009,  Mexico is one of only three countries in Latin America in which trade with the U.S. 
did not decrease by a minimum of 10 percent.    Thus, Mexico followed the regional trends of 179
expanding trade volume with China; however, the data suggests Mexico did not reorient its trade 
away from the U.S. toward China.  For Mexico, the most troubling aspect of its bilateral trade 
with China is that China runs a significant balance-of-trade surplus.  In 2007, Mexico exported 
$3.3 billion in goods to the PRC, while Chinese exports to Mexico were valued at $11.7 
billion.    This dramatic trade imbalance, when combined with the types of products being 180
exported,   could spell trouble for Mexico’s global economic competitiveness.  However, there 181
are growing signs that Mexico is likely to follow the rest of Latin America and reorient exports 
toward China to compensate.  Mexico has recently voiced its desire to double its oil exports to 
China in 2014 and begin diversifying away from an increasingly energy independent United 
States.   182
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 China has found inroads to FDI in Mexico difficult, largely due to the U.S.-Mexico 
bilateral economic relationship.  The U.S. remains Mexico’s largest trading partner and foreign 
direct investor by far.  Chinese foreign investment has been limited to a $1 billion loan from the 
China Development Bank to upgrade telecommunications infrastructure.    However, recent 183
developments might be a sign of things to come for Chinese FDI.  Infuriating  its leftist 
membership, the Mexican Congress voted in December 2013 to lift the seventy-five year 
monopoly of the state-owned oil firm, Petròleos Mexicanos.  This is projected to attract tens of 
billions of dollars of FDI in Mexico’s oil industry.    To be sure, the U.S. will compete 184
aggressively, but given China’s oil demand, the PRC is likely to increase its involvement in 
Mexico substantially. 
 Strategically and militarily, China’s interactions with Mexico have also been of less 
substance and much of the relationship has been driven by bilateral meetings to discuss 
increasing military cooperation.  There seems to be little substance to these interactions. Chinese 
Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Mexico City in September 2010   but the visit did not 185
produce anything specific.  As will be discussed, it does not serve China’s grand strategy well to 
be deliberately provocative with its military in the western hemisphere, much less with a trading 
partner like Mexico, positioned so geographically near the United States. 
!
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINA’S SOFT POWER 
!
 China has begun to aggressively wield its soft power in Latin America since it began 
decisively increasing its engagement with the region in the 2000s.  When Joseph Nye’s concept 
of “soft power” is more accurately defined to include aspects of economic power and the PRC 
authoritarian-capitalist development model is taken into account, China’s soft power in Latin 
America can be measured more accurately by including trade, foreign direct investment, and 
foreign aid programs.  As discussed, Nye’s definition of soft power fails to include economic 
power and its various forms as soft power resources.  Clearly, economic power is extraordinarily 
attractive and co-optive in nature.  At the very structural heart of economics, whether at the 
micro or macro level, is the concept of voluntary exchange:   the act of buyers and sellers freely 186
conducting voluntary market transactions.  When a consumer selects a commercial product  or 
service to purchase, on some level or another, they have found that product or service to be 
attractive or appealing and believe the value ascribed to the product or service by the seller 
serves their self-interest.  The transaction is entirely voluntary in nature.  The same is true of 
states and, due to its authoritarian-capitalist model, the same is true of the way China has 
deployed soft power in Latin America.  Economic transactions such as trade and foreign direct 
investment, because they are entirely voluntary and not coerced, should clearly be considered 
soft power, a critical error in Nye’s development and analysis of the soft power concept. 
Simply put: nation “A” is more likely to get nation “B” to want what nation “A” wants when 
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nation “A” has made multi-billion dollar investments in nation “B” and increased levels of and 
reduced barriers to free trade with nation “B.”   
 As we have seen, Nye, while he does discuss the need for states to utilize soft power 
resources, he does not discuss the timing of how, when, and how often (timing, means, and 
frequency) it should be utilized.  It is this “utility of scale” that matters most when analyzing soft 
power resource deployment and is the primary reason why PRC soft power resource deployment 
in Latin America has been so effective.  Just as financial resources can be spent wisely and 
unwisely, in large or small amounts, timely and untimely, so too can soft power.  In stark contrast 
to China, the United States has a tendency to not understand these aspects of soft power.  Often, 
this is associated with the tendency of U.S. foreign policy to wield hard power first and soft 
power later and the fact that U.S. soft power is often wielded by the private sector, not the U.S. 
government.  Analogously, a market investor may make a small but timely investment that brings 
huge returns or may make a massive, yet untimely investment that incurs incredible and costly 
losses.  With respect to PRC statecraft and soft power deployment, the Latin American case 
study is particularly fascinating because each of these “utility of scale” factors (timing, means, 
frequency) is in play.  The evidence strongly suggests the timing of China’s increased 
engagement in Latin America was no mistake.  To be sure, China had begun to look abroad for 
the natural resources and raw materials needed to continue fueling its exponential economic 
growth and Latin America is a resource-rich region of the world.  However, to do so in the U.S. 
“backyard” at a time when the attention of U.S. foreign affairs was focused almost exclusively 
on the Middle East and Central Asia (Iraq and Afghanistan) and when U.S. influence in Latin 
America was at an all-time low, is a vitally important point.  China wields soft power under a 
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“utility of scale” model–only when the means, timing, and frequency reinforce its own self 
interest–this enables China to maximize policy outcomes and execute its “hemispheric hedging” 
strategy effectively.   
 Also, China’s soft power influence in the region has been effective because of its ability 
to attract and co-opt nations who see China as a potential alternative development model to the 
United States.  While many nations in the region continue to maintain good relations with the 
U.S., the trends toward Chinese orientation and engagement, particularly on trade and 
investment, are rather staggering.    
 Lastly, Chinese soft power pursuits in Latin America are effective primarily due to the 
nature of the PRC authoritarian-capitalist model of statecraft which is better suited to execute a 
“utility of scale” approach to soft power deployment.  While U.S. soft power resources clearly 
dwarf those of China, authoritarian-capitalism allows China greater state control over its soft 
power resources–the state is the primary orchestrator of soft power.  This is not to at all 
downplay the importance of the current U.S. soft power resource supply advantage, but simply to 
highlight that a vast supply of soft power resources does not always correlate with policy 
outcomes.  China’s “utility of scale” model approach to soft power deployment in Latin America 
focuses on serving national interest, thereby increasing the efficiency and likelihood of 
successful policy outcomes.  Unlike the U.S., when China wields soft power, whether economic 
or cultural, the soft power resource is often wielded by the state itself.  In the case of Latin 




STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE? 
 As we have seen, China’s military has not been the primary instrument of power guiding 
its engagement with Latin America as it is not currently in its national interest to do so.  This 
distinction falls to soft power guided by a “utility of scale” approach.  By engaging Latin 
America with its “utility of scale” approach to soft power, the PRC does not appear to be actively 
seeking to militarily undermine the Monroe Doctrine–presumption of U.S. dominance of the 
western hemisphere–rather, Beijing appears to be very consciously respectful of it.    Any 187
strategic misstep or direct military provocation of U.S. dominance in the western hemisphere 
would be catastrophic to China’s “hemispheric hedging” strategy by simultaneously disrupting 
its ability to extract resources and raw materials needed for continued economic expansion and 
its desired trajectory for East Asian regional hard power dominance.  China has no interest 
whatsoever in mimicking Soviet behavior in Cuba during the Cold War, for example, as this 
would virtually guarantee failure of these strategic objectives.  The literature notes that the 
Chinese military (the People’s Liberation Army or PLA)  has constraints in Latin America; most 
notably, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control of the PLA and the lack of a global military 
reach and capability.    While the CCP is making massive investments to modernize the PLA 188
and strengthen military power, the strategic focus is not global in nature, but regional.  Indeed, 
throughout history, no powerful nation-state has achieved global hegemony without first 
achieving it regionally.  
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 While blatant military provocation of the U.S. in Latin America does not support China’s 
strategic goals, the goal of any PLA military presence might be best described as attaining 
strategic position, while supporting its primary economic goals for the region.    Strategic 189
implications in the western hemisphere for the increased economic presence in Latin America are 
more peripheral in nature.  First, as China has increased its economic engagement with the 
region, China has also increased its military-to-military cooperation and engagement.  Just as a 
lack of U.S. attention to Latin America opened the door for Chinese soft power deployment, it 
can be argued a similar dynamic exists with U.S. military-to-military engagement with the 
region   despite the the fact the U.S. remains the preponderant military power in the region.  As 190
has been discussed, military-to-military personnel visits and exchanges and bilateral cooperation 
on satellite, communications, and aerospace technology demonstrate the PRC’s desire to connect 
with their designated strategic partners in Latin America in ways that extend beyond economics.   
 The implications of certain Chinese infrastructure project investments in the region also 
move beyond economics and into the strategic realm.  The proposed Sino-Nicaraguan canal 
project is an excellent example.  A Chinese-constructed and controlled alternative to the Panama 
canal would allow for a heavy-volume increase in raw materials and commodities that can be 
shipped at lower import cost and could potentially allow for PLA naval navigation from Pacific 
to Atlantic oceans with less U.S. oversight and influence.  This is not meant to suggest that the 
U.S. controls the Panama Canal.  In fact, in an interesting twist of Chinese influence in the Latin 
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American region, when control and administration of the Canal Zone was returned to Panama in 
1999 by the United States, a Hong Kong-based company, Hutchison Whampoa Company, was 
granted the contract to provide operational support.    However, U.S. influence with Panama 191
remains strong and Panama remains one of the strongest diplomatic allies for Taiwan in the 
world.    Presumably, the PRC would prefer Panama switch its diplomatic loyalties, but if the 192
$40 billion proposed Nicaraguan canal project were to be built, it would again demonstrate 
Beijing’s willingness to use the “utility of scale” soft power approach to achieve its economic 
goals and improve its strategic positioning.  These types of strategic implications do not raise too 
many eyebrows in Washington and are relatively expected, given China’s economic engagement 
with the region.  These PRC strategic developments are not of themselves provocative of the 
United States in its own “backyard” nor are they intended to be.  Any such provocation would 
undermine PRC “hemispheric hedging” grand strategy.  China conducts itself in the western 
hemisphere so as to achieve economic objectives and foster military-to-military relationships to 
build strategic position without aggression.    Ellis puts it this way: 193
    
   “In the long-term, Chinese commercial activities in Latin America 
   supports the PRC strategic military position in a possible conflict with the 
   United States, without implying that the PRC either seeks, or expects, such 
   a conflict.”   194
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China has parlayed its economic power, gained in part through “utility of scale” soft power 
deployment in Latin America for regional military power in Asia and, just as it deploys soft 
power with a “utility of scale” to hedge its bets in Latin America, so too does China pick its spots 
to hedge militarily in east Asia: hemispheric hedging. 
!
PRC STRATEGIC FOCUS: HEMISPHERIC HEDGING & REGIONAL DOMINANCE 
 How do Chinese soft power pursuits in Latin America possibly impact events in East 
Asia?  The answer is rooted in a relatively simple line of reasoning.  The authoritarian capitalist 
model, because it is state-control-centric, allows China to achieve effective policy outcomes with 
its “utility of scale” soft power approach which bolsters the size and scope of China’s economic 
growth.  The more effectively and efficiently the PRC extracts raw materials and natural 
resources, the greater the likelihood China’s will continue this rapid and tireless economic 
growth.  As China’s economic power grows, so too does its military power and its willingness to 
use it in its own hemisphere.  This “hemispheric hedging” is a key component of China’s grand 
strategy and the most appropriate way to conceptualize Chinese smart power.  In a recent written 
exchange on the U.S.-China relationship, noted realist John Mearsheimer discussed the bi-
hemispheric strategic approach of Chinese statecraft and power pursuits: 
   “From China's point of view, it would be ideal to dominate Asia, and for 
   Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico to became a great power and force the United 
   States to concentrate on its own region. The great advantage the United 
   States has at the moment is that no state in the Western Hemisphere can 
   threaten its survival or security interests. So the United States is free to 
   roam the world causing trouble in other people's backyards. Other states, 
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   including China of course, have a vested interest in causing trouble in the 
   United States' backyard to keep it focused there.”   195!
 “Hemispheric hedging” centers on the idea, that because no nation-state can achieve 
hegemony in another region without first achieving it in its own, a state must hedge its bets 
abroad through economic, cultural, and other non-military means, while consolidating the 
requisite capabilities for dominance in its own region.  As hard power grows, a state may begin 
to hedge its bets militarily in its own region.  This is precisely the case with China.  As we have 
seen demonstrated in Latin America, China hedges in the western hemisphere by deploying a 
“utility of scale” soft power approach to serve its national interest with continued economic 
growth.  As economic power has grown, so too has PRC/PLA military capabilities and its 
willingness to hedge strategically in east Asia.  The United States does not seem alarmed by  the 
nature of Chinese hedges in the western hemisphere,   but when one accounts for the manner in 196
which the PRC hedges with its “utility of scale” soft power approach, China’s hard power hedges 
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PRC POWER: MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND INVESTMENT 
 Since 2011, the United States has reasserted itself in the East Asian region to reassure its 
allies that U.S. leadership in Asia will remain the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy and grand 
strategy.    Why the refocused efforts in Asia?  Simply put: the strategic implications of rising 197
Chinese hard power in the eastern hemisphere.  While scholars and policymakers have begun to 
question whether or not China is a revisionist power, increasing evidence suggests that China 
desires to dominate the region as the preponderant power,   much as the U.S. has dominated the 198
Western Hemisphere, and utilize its newfound international role to expand its strategic reach 
beyond Asia.  
 While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains the world’s largest army by size, U.S. 
policymakers and military leaders, and China’s regional neighbors remain concerned about 
additional developments which greatly increase PRC power projection capability in the Asia-
Pacific region.  According to the annual 2011 U.S. Department of Defense summary report to 
Congress entitled Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, Taiwan remains the 
short-term, primary strategic focus of PLA leaders and China is proactively seeking the ability to 
deter U.S. intervention in the event of military conflict with Taiwan.    The PRC and ROC 199
signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010 and, despite this recent 
warming of economic and cultural relations, Beijing continues its military buildup and persists in 
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its near-term focus on operationalizing “anti-access and area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities in the 
Taiwan Strait such that the military strategic balance strongly favors the PRC.    In support of 200
expanding capability to deny access and deter intervention by the U.S. and its allies in the event 
of conflict with Taiwan, China has prioritized modernizing its land-based ballistic and cruise 
missile programs.  In January 2007, China successfully tested an anti-satellite weapons system 
which used a kinetic kill vehicle (non-exploding, non-nuclear) to destroy a PRC weather 
satellite.    By December 2010, the PLA had between 1,000 and 1,200 short range ballistic 201
missiles deployed opposite Taiwan and had greatly improved the accuracy and payload of these 
weapons. 
 However, it is China’s maritime ambitions which are the cause for greatest concern to 
China’s neighbors in the Asia-Pacific.  Over the last two decades, the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) has modernized and transformed from a large fleet with little capability to a 
smaller force equipped with modern technology and increased multi-mission capability. 
According the U.S. Department of Defense:  
   “The PLA Navy possesses some 75 principal surface combatants, more 
   than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 
   85 missile-equipped small combatants.”     202!
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While simultaneously developing and testing its own aircraft carrier,   the PRC has developed 203
and recently operationalized its DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, designed to destroy an aircraft 
carrier.       These capability enhancements are rightfully concerning to China’s regional 204 205
neighbors and they point to a China seeking to directly challenge U.S. naval power as the 
primary anchor of security stability in the region since the end of World War II.   
 Perhaps most importantly, rising Chinese naval power is likely to fan flames of highly 
controversial territorial disputes.  Recently The Philippines sought U.S. counsel in a standoff 
over the presence of Chinese ships in the Scarborough Islands in the South China Sea and, as a 
result, conducted joint maritime military drills with the U.S.    In November 2011, the U.S. and 206
Australia deepened military ties and signed a status of forces agreement (SOFA) which would 
deploy 2,500 U.S. Marines in Australia.  While a small number of forces, it remains the first 
long-term expansion of the American military in the Pacific since the U.S. exit from Vietnam.  207
Japan and the U.S. have been in talks to realign U.S. military forces in Okinawa, Guam, and 
Hawaii   and recently the two have broadened their security alliance to include stationing U.S. 208
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naval drones and surveillance aircraft to patrol disputed areas in the East China Sea.    All of 209
these signs point to increased military activity and rising instability throughout the East Asia and 
broader Asia Pacific region.  
 There is strong correlation between Chinese economic growth and growth in military 
spending.  Growing empirical evidence suggests that China’s centralized authoritarian-capitalist 
model better enables the PRC ability to parlay its global economic power into regional military 
power.    Just as China has become the world’s second largest economy, it has also become the 210
world’s second biggest military spender next to the U.S. and over the previous two decades, the 
PRC has made significant investments in military modernization.  It is no surprise the world’s 
number two economy would invest in its military infrastructure.  Due to a lack of transparency 
from Beijing, debate exists as to the exact numbers, but it remains clear that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) currently presides over the world’s largest and most rapid military 
expansion and continues to make military spending a major priority.    Almost a mirror 211
reflection of its overall GDP growth, estimates show the PRC defense budget has easily 
experienced double digit growth over the last two decades.     212
!79
!  Steinhauer, Jennifer and Fackler, Martin. 2013. “U.S. and Japan Agree to Broaden Military Alliance.” 209
The New York Times. October 3, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/asia/japan-and-us-
agree-to-broaden-military-alliance.html
!  Dimitraki, Ourania and Ali, Faek Menla. 2013. “The Long-Run Causal Relationship Between Military 210
Expenditure and Economic Growth in China: Revisited.”  Defense and Peace Economics. (July 2013) p. 
12. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10242694.2013.810024
!  Wan, William. 2013. “China Makes Increased Military Spending a Top Priority as People’s Congress 211
Meets.” The Washington Post. March 5, 2013. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-05/world/
37448996_1_military-budget-annual-reports-luo-yuan
!  “China’s Military Rise: The Dragon’s New Teeth.” The Economist. April 7, 2012.  Print edition.  212
Accessed at http://www.economist.com/node/21552193
 Between 2001 and 2011, China’s economic growth averaged 10.4 percent per year, while 
military spending averaged 10.3 percent (15.6 percent in nominal terms).   According to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a think tank, annual PRC defense 
spending increased from $30 billion in 2000 to $166 billion in 2012.    While the overall 213
number is clearly dwarfed by the U.S. Department of Defense $689 billion, the growth trends 
remain important to China’s neighbors and to the United States.  If current trends continue, PRC 
defense spending will surpass that of the U.S. after 2035, continuing increased tensions in the 
east Asian region and shifting the regional balance of power in Asia in China’s favor.  In fact, 
some scholars already believe China is nearing U.S. military power in east Asia.  China notably 
spends more on its military than each of its regional neighbors Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
combined,   an important strategic fact given recent territorial disputes.  Most recently, and 214
arguably the most aggressive PRC hedge in Asia to-date, China declared an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea which includes the much-disputed Senkaku/
Diayou island chain.    This development proved provocative to Japan and the United States, 215
who immediately tested China’s resolve by conducting bomber flights into the newly declared 
zone near Senkaku/Diayou.  Some even believe China may have hedged their bets too far with 
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!  The dispute between China and Japan over this island chain extends even to its name. Termed Diayou 215
by China and Senkaku by Japan, this chain of islands, while a longtime territorial dispute, is quickly 
becoming the most intense focus of the potential for security competition in east Asia.
the ADIZ.    Territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, when combined 216
with China’s growing military power and willingness to wield its capabilities are signaling a 
Chinese desire to dominate the region and challenge U.S. hegemony by pushing the United 
States out of the region.   217
!
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 It is clear that China has pursued soft power in the western hemisphere to support its 
national interest.  Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power lacks the necessary detail, focuses far too 
heavily on soft power resource supply, and fails to account for state utility of soft power.  As a 
result, Nye is wrongfully dismissive of China’s soft power presence and capabilities.  As the case 
of Latin America demonstrates, China’s “utility of scale”   soft power approach enables China 218
to exact favorable policy outcomes that serve the national interest by driving its continued 
economic growth.  Chinese soft power in Latin America has peripheral strategic implications, but 
does not directly impede on the long held Monroe Doctrine; rather, it very deliberately respects 
it.  A key component of PRC grand strategy is “hemispheric hedging,”   which provides a 219
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!  Defined as timing, means, and frequency of utility.218
!  “Hemispheric hedging” centers on the idea, that because no nation-state can achieve hegemony in 219
another region without first achieving it in its own, a state must hedge its bets abroad through economic, 
cultural, and other non-military means, while consolidating the requisite capabilities for dominance in its 
own region.
conceptual construct for understanding comprehensive Chinese smart power.  China’s soft power 
pursuits in Latin America (and the western hemisphere) have strategic implications for east Asia 
because the PRC authoritarian-capitalist development model allows greater state control over 
soft power resource targeting.  As China’s economic power has grown as a result of soft power 
pursuits abroad, its military power has grown at an equally fast rate, inducing the likelihood of 
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